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FINANCING PEACEKEEPING FROM IMF AND IBRD
INCOME*
SAMUEL A. BLEICHER**
Professor Bleicher asserts that the present method of financing United

Nations peacekeeping operationsthrough annual contributions by Members
is unsatisfactory. Not only can it cause a financial crisis when certain Members refuse to pay, but also it may impair the United Nations peacekeeping
function. After exploring several alternativesfor providing stable income for
peacekeeping operations, Professor Bleicher concludes that portions of the
substantial net income of the InternationalMonetary Fund and the Bank for
Reconstruction and Development should be transferred to a United Nations
peacekeeping fund. He then analyzes the various methods of achieving the
transfers and suggests that the three organizations concerned should enter
into an agreement providing for fixed flow of funds from IMF and IBRD to
the United Nations.
INTRODUCTION

In 1942, C. Wilfred Jenks spoke before the Grotius Society on the
subject of financing international institutions. He pointed out the
unsatisfactory experience of the League of Nations, suggested some
possible sources of independent revenue, and called for detailed analysis of the problem by his colleagues. One paragraph of that speech in
particular is worth repeating because of its timeliness today:'
In international, as in national, affairs good administration presupposes sound finance. Unless more adequate financial resources are available to public international bodies, and the collection of a high percentage
of the sums provided for in their budgets on the date on which those
sums are due can be relied upon with reasonable confidence, in good
times and in bad, the working of such bodies will remain, as it has thus
far been, at best a precarious experiment. It is not without significance
that in the evolution of all major federations the financial relationships
between the federal authorities and the federated units have been of crucial importance.
The sad fact is that little progress has been made in the study of
United Nations financing since that time. Not much has been written
on the subject, and almost no one has attempted to set up any explicit
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Louis B. Sohn of Harvard Law School, who supervised the writing of this paper. He is, of course, not
responsible for any errors that may be present.
** B.A., Northwestern University; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor
of Law. University of Toledo College of Law.
2Jenks, Sonze Legal Aspects of the Financing of International Institutions, 28
TRANSACT. GRoT. Soc'" 88 (1942).
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criteria for judging proposed solutions, or to analyze the legal problems
and financial results of a particular plan in the necessary detail. It is
perhaps understandable, as Jenks commented in his address, that international lawyers, schooled in concepts of state sovereignty and the consensual basis of treaties, are not greatly creative in the field of public
finance. But as a result, the task of finding a satisfactory financing
proposal must begin without the benefit of the kind of standards and
analytical techniques which might have been developed by now had
Jenks' advice been followed. The present crisis in the United Nations
over the expenses of emergency forces makes analysis of the problem
even more imperative today than it was 20 years ago.
I. THE INEFFICACY OF AssEsSMENTS
AND THE NEED FOR A PEACE FUND

The record of collection of United Nations assessments clearly demonstrates that while assessment is an adequate method of paying the
general expenses of the Organization, it is unsatisfactory to finance
major peacekeeping operations. The Secretary General's most recent
available report on the collection of contributions, which was presented
to the General Assembly on November 30, 1964, showed net assessments for that year's Regular Budget of $85.2 million, of which $61.9
million had been received, and $23.3 million in current assessments
were still outstanding.2 The large amount unpaid results largely from
the slowness of national legislatures in approving their budgets, and it
is almost completely eliminated by the fall of the next year, as the low
level of arrears shows. Arrears-unpaid contributions from previous
years-amounted to $2.1 million in 1964, indicating that virtually all
of the previous years' assessments had been paid by this time. These
figures are representative in comparison with those of other years, and
the amount of arrears since 1957 has remained less than 10 percent of
total contributions.3 The United Nations also collected $15 million in
'U.N. Doe. A/5822 (1964).
'The figures from previous years are as follows:

Balance Due

Arrears

Year

Assessment
(million $)

(Sept.)
(million $)

(Sept.)
(million $)

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962

51.5
57.5
53.1
64.1
66.7

15.8
19.0
14.0
22.2
22.0

3.7
3.3
3.6
4.0
4.8

1963
82.4
35.0
5.6
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/778 (1959); U.N. Doc. A/C.5/824 (1960); U.N. Doc. A/C.5/879
(1961); U.N. Doc. A/C.5/920 (1962); U.N. Doe. A/C.5/985 (1963).
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additional advances to the Working Capital Fund during 1963 and
1964 with outstanding success.4 As of November 30, 1964, only
$24,919, less than one-tenth of 1 percent, remained uncollected; and
$16,000 of that sum represented current assessments of new Members.
Nevertheless, despite the good record on Regular Budget collections,
since 1962 the United Nations has been in desperate financial straits
because of arrears in the payment of peacekeeping expenses. The contrast between the collection records for the Regular Budget and the
peacekeeping accounts is impressive. Both major peace forces were
financed in essentially the same way: contributions by Members, on
the basis of General Assembly assessments on a slightly different scale
from that of the Regular Budget, segregated in special accounts.' The
Secretary General's reports on contributions show the magnitude of
the collection problem for the United Nations Emergency Force in
Palestine (UNEF) Special Account and the United Nations Congo
Operation (ONUC) Ad Hoc Account.
For 1964, the General Assembly voted an assessment for UNEF of
$16.3 million. By November 30, 1964, only $11.0 million of this
amount had been collected. The record of arrears for UNEF demonstrates that insufficient time to appropriate the money was not the
cause of the delay, as in the case of the Regular Budget. Of the $33.1
million of arrears in January 1964, $29.1 million remained unpaid by
December. And for previous years, the situation has been the same.7
Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Arrears in January
(million $)
8.8
15.4
18.7
21.9
25.7
27.6

Arrears in September
(million $)
5.1
13.2
17.5
21.1
25.2
27.2

Unlike the pattern of the Regular Budget assessments which are over
90 percent paid up by the fall of the next year, the deficit for UNEF
peacekeeping operations cumulates as each year's collections fall
'In December 1962, an increase in the Working Capital Fund from $22 million to
$40 million was approved by the General Assembly, mainly to finance the period of
delay in collection of regular assessments, G.A. Res. 1863, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 17, at
60, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962).
'The alteration of the scale of assessments is renewed in each resolution that
authorizes funds for peacekeeping. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2115, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
14, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
'U.N. Doc. A/5822 (1964).

'U.N. Doc. A/C.5/778 (1959); U.N. Doc. A/C.5/879 (1961); U.N. Doc. A/C.5/985
(1963).
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below, and remain below, the assessment voted. By December 1964,
only 75 percent of the 1957 UNEF assessment had been paid, and the
proportion is lower for all subsequent years. Fifty-one Members owed
arrears, as compared to twenty-one for the Regular Budget.
The ONUC contributions show the same pattern:
Year
1962
1963

Arrears in January
(million $)
54.3
76.2

Arrears in September
(million $)
50.9
71.9

1964

95.1

82.18

The proportion of the ONUC assessment paid has not exceeded 66
percent for any year, and 61 Members were in arrears on November
30, 1964.
The resultant effect on United Nations finances has been disastrous.
The United Nations statement of accounts for calendar 1963 showed a
deficit in the General Fund, Working Capital Fund and Trust Funds
of $117.9 million and a surplus for the Organization as a whole (considering all peacekeeping accounts receivable as assets) of $44.7 million.'
At the end of 1964, the deficit in the funds had fallen to $110.6 million,
but the surplus dropped to $22.7 million. 10 The money to cover the uncollected accounts receivable has come from the United Nations Bond
Issue, from voluntary contributions in 1965 of $20 million by several
Members," and from $54 million in advance payments of assessments
in 1965.12 Nevertheless, it was necessary to postpone reimbursement
of nations who assisted in peacekeeping operations, and to borrow from
the account of the voluntary Special Fund to meet payroll commitments in April and May of 1965.11
On October 11, 1965, the Secretary General reported to the Fifth
Committee: 4
I have estimated that an amount of approximately $100 million would be
required to enable the Organization to liquidate in full the obligations
8

Nov. 30, 1964. September statistics for 1964 are unavailable because of the delay
in convening the General Assembly that year. Also, comparable figures for 1960 and
1961 are unavailable because assessments were readjusted under General Assembly
Resolution 1583 (XV) and arrears for those years were combined.
'U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1018 (1964).
"°U.N. Doc.
A/C.5/1034 (1965).
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1037 (1965).
'Advance payments were requested in Resolution 2004 (XIX) to cover the depletion of the Working Capital Fund. Both the Western and Soviet blocs responded.

See U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1032 (1965).
U.N.Doc. A/5917 (1965).

' U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1037 (1965).
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currently outstanding against the special accounts of the United Nations
Emergency Force and the United Nations operation in the Congo; to
meet in full the additional obligations that will be incurred, in the case of
the Emergency Force, between 1 September 1965 and such time as a
decision will have to be [sic] reached at the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the future of that operation and its financing; to
restore the Working Capital Fund to its authorized level of $40 million;
and to cover amounts due to Member States as adjustments on assessed
contributions for the costs of the two peacekeeping forces mentioned.
The United Nations deficit of $117.9 million at the end of 1963 is almost completely accounted for by the UNEF Special Account arrears
of $27.2 million, the ONUC Ad Hoc Account arrears of $71.9 million,
and the then current unpaid portions of the UNEF and ONUC assessments of $8.8 million and $27.7 million.15
The conclusion suggested by these statistics is that although annual
assessment of Members is a satisfactory method of financing ordinary
administrative expenses, economic development projects, and social
and physical welfare programs, it is unreliable as a method of financing
peacekeeping operations. If one looks beyond the bare statistics to
consider whether this behavior is to be expected and is likely to continue, it becomes clear that the lesson of the past and present must be
taken seriously. There is every reason to believe that United Nations
Members will perform no better in the future than they have in the
past.
As a general matter, peacekeeping operations are the least palatable
of international activities because of the degree to which they impinge
on traditional national prerogatives. Unlike most other international
programs, whose demands are for the most part limited to economic
resources, the underlying demand of the United Nations on its Members in relation to police operations is political disinterestedness in matters thought to be vital to national interest. The foreign policy goals of
a substantial number of nations may be hampered at one time or another by the possibility of United Nations action. The immediate
threat of major war or civil strife in a strategic area of the world is
occasionally frightening enough to bring quarreling powers together to
avoid the imminent disaster. Some nations may even expect an outcome particularly to their advantage. But when the fear that makes
'The surplus of unpaid assessments over the deficit apparently results from the
fact that part of the expenditures for which current assessments have been approved

had not yet been made at this point in the fiscal year.
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peace forces possible subsides, the costs remain, and Members who are
in retrospect dissatisfied may refuse to pay. Refusal to pay peacekeeping assessments is not a matter of national economics but of international politics. It is a way of expressing disapproval of programs
that have already been carried out, and of discouraging their continuation or emulation.
Compounding this political problem and in part arising out of it, is
the continuing controversy over the internal allocation of peacekeeping
powers within the United Nations. The Soviet Union, along with
France and others, argues that: 16
[T]he only body authorized to take action in the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security is the Security Council.
It is likewise within the purview of the Security Council to adopt decisions in all matters relating to the establishment of United Nations armed
forces, the definition of their duties, their composition and strength, the
direction of their operations, the structure of their command and the
duration of their stay in the area of operation, and also matters of financing. No other United Nations body, including the General Assembly,
has the right under the Charter to decide these matters.
Against this position, the United States, which sponsored the "Uniting
for Peace" Resolution laying the groundwork for an active General
Assembly role in peacekeeping, argues that the Security Council has
only "primary responsibility" for peacekeeping.17 When the Security
Council is deadlocked, the General Assembly may call for volunteers to
re-establish peace. As a corollary to this view, the United States insists
that the General Assembly, under article 17, has the responsibility for
apportioning peacekeeping expenses like any others.'" The U.S.S.R.,
however, says that the aggressor nations should pay for United Nations
police forces, and that in any case the Security Council must decide the
matter.
Whatever the legal correctness of either of these positions, it is clear
that the dispute aggravates doubts that future emergency programs
will be any better financed than those in the past. Furthermore,
nations opposed to a particular United Nations peacekeeping operation
for political reasons will find the legal problem of the division of
"0 U.N. Doc. A/C.121/2 (1965).
' U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. (emphasis added). It would be fascinating to
see a linguistic study of the degree of exclusivity implied by the word "primary" in
English,
French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese.
'8 U.N. Doc A/AC.121/3 (1965), previously issued as U.N. Doc. A/AC.113/30

(1964).
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responsibility between Security Council and General Assembly a convenient lever with which to obstruct peacekeeping operations and
weaken the United Nations by withholding financial support.
The Great Powers are becoming especially unreliable as a source of
funds for peacekeeping because of another factor: the increased membership of the United Nations. The smaller Members generally want
the United Nations to take more responsibility for the direction of
international relations, economic development, and other matters of
world concern. 19 They are more willing to alter the structure of the
organization to strengthen the United Nations as a whole and to improve their position in it. The recent expansion of the Security Council
and the Economic and Social Council are evidence of their political
power, as were the votes taken in the closing days of the 20th General
Assembly Session.2" One result of this increased power of small nations may be a widening gap between the actions the Organization
takes and the preferences of the major contributors to the United
Nations budget. Peacekeeping is likely to be the area in which the
small Members will be most cautious and most concerned about Great
Power support. But the continued pressure in other fields for programs which the Great Powers dislike may create a general attitude of
alienation from the United Nations and a decreased desire to maintain
its strength. This possibility will make the financing of politically
unpalatable peacekeeping operations less reliable than it has been in the
past. Thus a political analysis of the relations of Members with the
Organization and with each other reinforces the conclusions drawn
from the historical data: Member contributions are an unsatisfactory
means of supporting United Nations peacekeeping operations.
A look at the predicted future pattern of United Nations expenditures gives further reason to doubt the ability of the United Nations to
support new peacekeeping operations. It has already been forced to
take advantage of every available accounting device and every opportunity to appeal for Members' support in order to avoid outright
insolvency, and it will almost certainly be suffering chronic shortages of
funds for the foreseeable future. In 1962 Professors Henry Nau and
Norman Padelford made a general study to predict United Nations

11

J. VircFNT, THE CAUcUsING GRoups OF THE UNITED NATIONS-AN EXAmiNATION OF THER ATTITUDEs TOWAivm THE ORGANIZATION 171-72, 190-91, 211-14 (1964).

'°The underdeveloped nations, combining with the Communist bloc, for the first
time outvoted United States and its friends on whether certain subjects are "important questions" under art. 18 of the United Nations Charter. Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 22, 1965, § 1, at 11, col. 4.
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expenditures to 1975.21 Using a method that might best be described as
intelligent linear projection, they extrapolated present growth rates of
various expenditures, making corrections where they felt that specific
factors made that trend unlikely. The results indicate that the United
Nations system will be growing very rapidly in the coming decade. The
most spectacular increases will come in the voluntary programs which
will grow at a rate of about 8 percent per year between now and 1975.
The Specialized Agencies during this decade will almost double their
present assessed budgets, while the Regular Budget will increase by almost 50 percent.22 A comparison of these projections with 1965 and
1966 expenditures indicates that they may be conservative.23 But if
they are at all correct, the United Nations will be expanding the scope
of its activities constantly, and suffering from the shortage and misallocation of funds and facilities that accompany such expansions. At the
same time, it will continually find itself short of funds as a result of current delays and arrears in the payment of assessments. The same percentage of Regular Budget arrears in 1975 will amount to about $11
million, over 25 percent of the Working Capital Fund. Also, financing
the gap between assessment and collection of current contributions will
become progressively more expensive as the size of the Regular Budget
grows, despite the "advance payment" plan that was begun in 1965.
Professors Nau and Padelford included in their study an estimate of
the costs of peacekeeping operations. They projected a slight increase
I H. NAU & N. PADELFORD, AN ANALYSiS OF UNITED NATIOiNS EXPENSES WITH
COST ESTIMATES TO 1975 (1963).

The projections are as follows:
(in millions-actual)
1957
1960
1962
Regular Budget
$ 53.1
$ 65.3
$ 85.8
Specialized Agency
48.7
59.3
80.3
Expenditures
(excluding
IAEA)
Voluntary Contri-

95.5

145.0

182.0

butions
Total
$197.3
$269.6
$358.1
Expenditures in the last two years were:
1965
(U.N. Estimate)

(in millions-projected)
1965
1970
1975
$108.7
$131.8
$153.0
113.2
153.5
195.0

386.5

578.6

828.0

$608A

$863.9

$1176.0

1965
(Actual)

1966
(U.N. Estimate)

(million)
(million)
(million)
Regular Budget
$104.7
$108.5
$121.6
Specialized Agency Expenditures
$142.8
$131.5
$116.7
(excluding IAEA)
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1008 (1964) ; U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1026 (1965) ; G.A. Res. 2124, 20
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 14, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/2124 (1965).
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in the cost of UNEF, up to $22.5 million by 1975. But only $15 million
a year was included for all other peacekeeping, on the basis of the fol-

lowing assumption :24
We are assuming that no issues as controversial as the Congo debacle
will arise in the next twelve years to prolong the present financial and
political disagreements or to precipitate a new financial or constitutional
crisis. It is acknowledged that this is a large assumption. This may not
prove to be realistic. The historical record does not warrant optimism
that it will be borne out....
The artificiality of that assumption is perhaps more apparent today
than when it was decided upon. Since 1962 the war in Vietnam, the
conflict in Kashmir, the unilateral seizure of independence by Rhodesia, among others, have created not one but several situations in which
a United Nations peace force might be needed. And the existing token
forces in Cyprus and the Middle East might have to be greatly expanded at any timeY5 In these circumstances, it seems more likely
that there will be several serious crises before 1975 than that peace will
prevail. Just when another peacekeeping effort will be required is difficult to predict, but there is no reason to expect the next 10 years will be
more peaceful than the last 20.
When the United Nations is next called upon, the result may be a
financial collapse of the whole Organization. It has been able to maintain its solvency despite the costs of the Congo operation by borrowing
from its various trust funds and delaying the payment of certain
debts. But unless some effective means of financing future peacekeeping activities is found, it is unlikely that the Organization could survive
another shock of this magnitude. Deficits in future peacekeeping operations would pose a serious danger to the solvency and viability of the
United Nations as a whole.
This threat of collapse if the United Nations attempts new peacekeeping operations substantially weakens the present international
position of the Organization as well. Its diplomatic effectiveness, like
that of a national government, largely depends on the degree to which
the nations it deals with expect that it can carry out the policy goals it
has set for itself. For purposes of both negotiation and deterrence, the
credibility of the implied threat of a United Nations emergency force is
'NAU &PADELFoRD, supra note 21, at 1/4.

This article was written before the Arab-Israeli conflict of June, 1967.-ED.
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crucial, regardless of the Organization's moral authority as the representative of the governments of the world. An expectation of effectiveness is particularly important for the United Nations because its jurisdiction in practice depends upon the willingness of Members to bring
disputes to it. If they have confidence in the Organization they will call
upon it and give it the opportunity to act effectively; otherwise it will
find itself increasingly peripheral to world events and ultimately irrelevant. Thus one of the most damaging effects of the United Nations
financial crisis is the loss of confidence it has already engendered.
The inadequacy of annual post hoc contributions to finance peacekeeping means that a new method must be found which will not only
provide the money when necessary but will be immediately recognized
as a means of financing that the United Nations can rely upon when the
need arises, whatever the nature of the crisis. To meet this need, it has
been widely recommended that the United Nations establish a Peace
Fund, in which sufficient sums to pay for future as well as past peacekeeping operations would be accumulated. In the 1963 Special Session,
the General Assembly voted to have the Secretary General study the
proposal, 6 but so far he has not progressed beyond the stage of canvassing the member governments for their opinions. The amounts suggested range from $25 million to $500 million. Considering the present
debt of $100 million and the fact that ONUC at one point was costing
over $120 million annually, it would seem essential that a credible and
effective Peace Fund accumulate several hundred million dollars within
a few years, and that adequate provision for replenishment be made.
The advantages of an adequate Peace Fund would be substantial.
Most importantly, it would provide the necessary financial support for
emergency forces when needed. In times of peace, it would stand as a
tangible symbol of the ability of the United Nations to cope with any
international security problem that might arise. A portion of it could
be used to train officers and retain a skeleton staff of planners and
administrators to keep the Organization in a state of readiness2 7
Strengthening the capability of the Organization in this way would
greatly enhance its prestige and effectiveness. There is little doubt that
a Peace Fund would result in a more prominent role for the United
Nations and increase the power of the majority to get action. Professor
G.A. Res. 1879 (Spec. Sess. IV) (1963).

" Padelford, Financig Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis, 19
(1965).

INT'L

ORG. 444, 460
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John Stoessinger has pointed out the influence a Peace Fund would
have on the United Nations :28
[A] financially independent United Nations would be able to function on
the basis of the consent of states, without requiring their active support.
Mere acquiescence by a state would amount to a vote for, not against, a
program. When United Nations operations are based on compulsory
assessment, the middle ground of permissiveness is, in effect, eliminated
...a United Nations that could draw on its own treasury would have no
need to press indifferent states to lend active financial support and
thereby risk shoving them into the ranks of the opponents of its actions.
Although his analysis may be an overstatement, it does indicate the
kind of effect a Peace Fund would have on the dynamics of United
Nations decision-making.
Objections have been raised, however, by both scholars and member
states.20 One is that Members who opposed a particular peacekeeping
operation, if unable to thwart it through the medium of finances,
would try other methods. But financial obstruction poses so serious a
threat to the United Nations that the dangers from other hypothetical
forms of obstruction are unlikely to be as great as the present dangers
of bankruptcy and declining prestige. Effectively strengthening the
Organization financially will also make it more impervious to other
forms of opposition which under present circumstances could destroy
it.
Another objection is that the ability to authorize peacekeeping without paying for it may encourage irresponsibility. But while cost may
be the major obstacle to United Nations action in other fields, it can
hardly be imagined that simply because money is available, member
states, traditionally so jealous of their sovereign prerogatives, would
vote for emergency forces under any but the most serious circumstances. The primary issue is still a political one, and the many complications that beset ONUC are likely to reinforce the diplomatic
instinct toward caution even when financing is available. The most
important obstacle to the establishment of a Peace Fund is the same
problem that has plagued past United Nations peacekeeping efforts:
lack of an adequate reliable source of revenue. If a satisfactory source
of revenue can be found, the path may be opened for a more effective
' 30
United Nations effort to "maintain international peace and security. 2
1 J. SToEssIrER, FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS

Id. at 31-32, 268.
U.N.

CHARTER,

art. 1, para. 1.

SYsTE-i 30 (1964).
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II. ALTERNATIvE METHODS OF FINANCING A PEACE FUND
Over the years many suggestions, ranging from budget ceilings to
general taxes, have been proposed as solutions for the problem of
United Nations financing. Because intelligent evaluation depends
upon the development of criteria which can be applied to any plan, it
seems essential to establish some general requirements. Those that
follow are only a tentative beginning, but perhaps they can be used as
a foundation upon which to build an adequate and detailed set of standards. The first three deal with economic considerations, the last three
with political matters.
A. Productionof Adequate Revenue
Any proposal must demonstrate that it will raise a sufficient amount
of revenue to pay for predictable, and to some extent even unpredictable, peacekeeping ventures. It should hold out some assurance that it
will continue to function adequately in the foreseeable future, and that
it will be able to grow if and as more funds are needed. From what
has been said above, it is apparent that several hundred million dollars
is needed in the near future, and a continuous flow of at least $30 million will be necessary for an indefinite period.
B. Minimum Cost
This criterion has two aspects: capital costs and administrative
costs. A plan for revenue that might otherwise be very satisfactory
may be unrealistic because the United Nations does not have the capital to invest, unless some other source of funds can be found for the
purpose. For example, plans to develop the economic potential of outer
space appear to require billions of dollars of investment before any
revenue can be expected. If the United Nations had sufficient capital
for these purposes, it could easily finance peacekeeping at the levels
presently contemplated. As for administrative costs, it must be remembered that it is the net revenues to the Organization, rather than gross
amount collectable, that is crucial. A plan that required constant policing of the use of the oceans or of international trade might result in
costs that absorbed a relatively large portion of the revenue produced,
unless Members donated these services.
C. Wide Distributionof Burden
While it would be most desirable for all Members of the Organization to contribute in proportion to their ability to do so, this matter is
not crucial. But it is essential that no single country or small group of
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countries be put in a position to exercise a power of strangulation on
the funds provided by the financing plan. The Organization must not
be forced to depend on a few countries for the revenue for peacekeeping operations. It is perhaps worth noting at this point that the purpose of a new financing plan is not to alter the distribution of the burden of support. It is no criticism of a plan to say that governments will
end up paying the expenses in one form or another anywayYs What
matters is not that the same Members pay the cost, but that the funds
can be efficiently collected even when some governments might be
indisposed toward contribution.
D. Integrity of the Secretariat
Any proposal which involved extensive use of Secretariat personnel
must be closely examined to guarantee that the international and nonpolitical character of the Secretariat is not compromised.s 1a A plan
which puts part of the Secretariat staff pro tanto at the disposal of a
Member may have the effect of making some Members less willing to
cooperate with it, to the detriment of the United Nations as a whole.
For example, if the United Nations were willing for a fee to analyze the
economic strengths and weaknesses of another Member's economy,
that Member would almost certainly consider its security threatened.
The history of Czechoslovakia's compulsory withdrawal from the International Monetary Fund illustrates this sensitivity.
E. OperationWithout Full Support
For a financing plan to be fully effective, its operation (as distinguished from its adoption) should not depend on the continuous support of every Member. Once a peacekeeping operation has been decided upon by the United Nations through the proper procedures, no
Member should have a "financial veto" to add to its other voting rights.
A reliable financing mechanism is one that operates precisely at the
time when some Members might feel disposed to withdraw their support. If the Secretary General has direct access to funds once they
have been allocated to a specific use, the danger of extralegal obstruction will be diminished.
" For this argument, see STOESSINGER, supra note 28, at 269.
"' The importance of this concern is made clear by article 100, para. 1 of the
charter:
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not
seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority
external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might
reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Orgaani-

zation.
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F. Acceptability
Any desirable plan must necessarily be acceptable to at least a substantial majority of United Nations Members, and it is the tension between what the Organization needs and what the Members will accept
that makes the problem of financing so difficult. The following three
factors seem to be most relevant, but the choice is more a result of intuition than research. They are presented in the hope that they will
inspire further investigation and examination of the problem:
1. Effect on Sovereignty. Both old and new nations are still very
sensitive to any infringement of their sovereign rights, and any proposal
which forces a substantial number of Members to abandon powers they
are actively exercising would not be accepted in the present international environment regardless of its redeeming features. The most
desirable plan from this standpoint would be one that was completely
outside the traditional sphere of national activity, though complementary activities that paralleled but did not affect Members' powers might
be acceptable. A plan that interfered with national taxation powers or
regulation of imports would be less acceptable, for instance, than one
which did not require any modification of national policy.
2. Danger of Overexpansion. Nothing arouses the suspicion of
governments so much as a plan that lacks well-defined legal and
conceptual limits. The concept of the plan must be such that no
recognizable modification of it would appear dangerous either per se
or as a precedent. Perhaps the greatest weakness of a proposal for a
United Nations income tax is the impression it gives of "opening the
door" to unlimited expansion.
3. Adverse Effect on Private Interests. A State might be willing, in
the interests of international peace and security, to permit the taxation
of international trade, transportation, communication, or other "commercial" activities owned and operated by the government. But
where the activity affected by a financing plan is in private hands,
political pressure to prevent such taxation seems inevitable. American
Telephone and Telegraph, for example, could be expectd to oppose any
effort to surcharge international telephone service because of its
adverse effect on profits. If the private interests affected have significant influence in some of the major governments, the probability of the
32
proposal's acceptance may be substantially reduced.
These six criteria-production of adequate revenue, minimum cost,
2

COiiISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, STRENGTHENING THE UNITED

NATIONS

260-61 (1957).
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wide distribution of burden, neutrality of the Secretariat, operation
without full support, and acceptability-seem to be the essential standards for evaluating any proposed plan for financing United Nations
peacekeeping. A criterion based on the fear among Members of the
increased power of the United Nations itself is inappropriate to this
inquiry. Insofar as Members fear greater United Nations power per
se, as opposed to the specific limitation of their own power, no proposal will be satisfactory, nor will the present scheme work effectively.
There is no purpose in discussing financing plans unless one assumes
that some ideal plan, which measures up to some ideal set of criteria,
would be adopted by the Members.
The proposals which have been suggested to improve the financial
condition of the United Nations can be divided into three general
categories. The first group includes plans 33 which are best described as
"budgetary devices." Most of them, e.g., putting a ceiling on the budget,
tying appropriations to their corresponding resolutions, or unifying
the United Nations and Specialized Agency budgets, 34 are aimed at

saving rather than raising funds; some would impose new sanctions
for nonpayment of assessments. Whatever the merits of these plans,
none meets the first criterion for a financing plan-assured production
of adequate additional revenue.
Another group of proposals deals with what might be called "nongovernmental activities" in that they would have the United Nations
become an entrepreneur of one sort or another. Typical examples are
development of the Antarctic or the oceans, 5 or creation of a United
Nations consultant service. For the long run, many of them may hold
promise. But many would require huge outlays of capital, and none
would provide immediately a reliable source of income of the magnitude required.
The third group is "governmental activity"-the collection of general or special taxes, by whatever name. Although a general tax on
income appears to be unacceptable in today's international climate, 36
specialized taxes on international activities seem to have some potential. One proposal is to add an extra one cent of postage on all interna'See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
SESs., BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1954).

83d CONG., 2d
(Comm. Print

"' CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED

NATIONS (United Nations Studies, No. 1, 1947).
Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Independent Revenue for the United Nations, 18

241, 243-53 (1964).
" C. NICHOLS, FINANCING
(1961).
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tional mail. Because over 4.7 billion international letters were mailed
from the noncommunist nations, Hungary, and Yugoslavia in 1963,38
the gross revenue from a charge on all types of international mail
would probably be substantially more than the $47 million indicated by
this figure. Administrative expenses would not be too great if United
Nations stamps were sold directly to the national postal departments;
and enforcement would be relatively easy because both the sending and
receiving post offices could check compliance. The burden of such a
plan would fall more heavily on small nations than large ones, and
many nations might consider it an invasion of sovereignty. At present,
it seems unacceptable, but with more refinement, perhaps some of the
complications could be eliminated.
Another proposal is to tax the use of international canals." While
this plan has often been considered, the history of the Suez Canal fee
charged by the United Nations to pay for its clearance operations indicates that private interests would vigorously oppose any plan of this
kind.

40

The most desirable proposal, especially in consideration of the urgent and immediate need for funds, seems to be a plan to transfer a
part of the income of the International Monetary Fund (Fund) and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Bank)
to the United Nations." The remainder of this analysis will deal with
the economic and legal basis of this plan, examining in detail its features and the obstacles to its adoption.

III.

THE INCOME AND FINANciAL STRUCTURE OF THE FUND
AND THE BANK

It is quite clear that the proposal satisfies some of the criteria presented, such as retaining the integrity of the Secretariat and avoiding
high administrative cost. The acceptability of the proposal will not be
analyzed separately, but some relevant factors will be noted in relation
to other matters of concern. A proposal of this type raises an additional consideration that is not relevant to most financing plans: the
adverse effect it might have on the institutions from which the funds
are taken. Thorough consideration of the operation of the Fund and
supra note 28, at 271-75.

' STOESSINGER,
UNION POSTALE

'

UNIVERSELLE,

STATISTIQUE

1963: TRAFFIC-RESULTAT FINANCIER 12, 28 (1965).
"See note 33 supra at 19.

REDUITE

DES

SERVICES

POSTAUX

'o J. Fried, U.N. Revenue Through Levies on International Activities 38 (mimeographed draft) (1962).
" COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, supra note 32, at 260-61.
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the Bank is necessary at this point to determine whether adequate
revenue could be assured, how the burden would be distributed, and
what effect the plan would have on these two institutions. The problem
of making the financial support independent of the continuing approval of all Members will be considered in the discussion of the
various legal devices that could be used to transfer Fund and Bank
revenues to the United Nations.
It will be most convenient in considering the financial condition of
the Fund and the Bank to examine each one separately. The Fund
began operation in 1946 and ran a deficit in every year but one through
fiscal 1956.42 During this period gross income reached a peak of $4.97
million in fiscal 1954, but was at its lowest after the first year in fiscal
1956. Meanwhile costs of operation rose steadily but at a decreasing
rate from $2.07 million in the first year to $5.35 million in fiscal 1956.
By then the accumulated deficit on operations exceeded $14 million.
In 1956 two great changes occurred-one planned, the other unforeseen; they have transformed the Fund's financial condition. The
planned change was a step on the part of the Directors to eliminate the
accumulated deficit by putting some of the Fund's gold to work. The
Fund began operations with $1,344.3 million in gold, approximately
56 percent of which was on deposit in the United States. By fiscal
1956 this amount had grown steadily to $1,761.4 million as a result of
payment of gold quotas and increased membership. On January 25,
1956, the Executive Board, "observing that the Fund has had and may
continue to have" a deficit, decided that "it would be appropriate to
raise income towards the deficit by the investment of a portion of the
Fund's gold...." Exercising their power under article XVIII(a),
which gives the Executive Board authority to interpret the Fund
Agreement, they agreed to "interpret the Articles of Agreement to
permit... sale of a portion of the Fund's gold to the United States for
the purpose of investment of the proceeds in United States Treasury
bills having not more than ninety-three days to run," subject to the
qualifications that the Fund could reacquire gold at any time, and that
the investment would always be treated as gold, rather than United
States currency. 43 The latter qualification would protect the Fund's
investment against exchange restrictions or devaluation imposed by
'2 The statistics of Fund income and expenditures are taken from the IMF annual
reports for various years. The fiscal year ends on April 30, so the greater portion of
the transactions included in any fiscal year actually took place in the previous calendar

year.

13IMF, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIvEs DIRECTORS 112 (3d ed. 1965).
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the United States. The original investment was of $200 million, and
in the first full year, fiscal 1957, it brought income of $4.9 million. It
was expected that within a few years the deficit could be eliminated.
In subsequent years, the gold investment program has been expanded. In November 1957, when it became apparent that the deficit
would be eliminated by the net operating income from that year
(fiscal 1958) alone, it was decided to continue the investment (with a
delicate deletion of the references to a deficit found in the previous
resolution) and to place the income from this investment in a Special
Reserve, which appears only as a footnote to the income statement.4"
After the Fund's gold holdings were almost doubled by an increase in
quotas and repayment of some borrowings, the amount of the investment was increased to $500 million in July, 1959, and then to $800 million in November, 1960.11 Investment in 12- and 15-month Treasury
securities rather than 90-day bills was countenanced. The annual income from this investment has grown to $30.8 million in fiscal 1965,
and the Special Reserve has a balance of $148.3 million.
The unexpected change that improved the Fund's financial position
was the huge volume of purchases and standby arrangements in late
1956, 1957, and 1958, growing out of the Suez crisis, which dislocated
trade and upset the balance of payments of several European nations.
Gross income from operations jumped from $1.7 million in fiscal 1956
to $9.4 million for fiscal 1957 and $23.6 million for fiscal 1958, while
costs of operation grew only to $5.7 million. Since that time, the
Fund's earned income has always substantially exceeded costs. In
1958 and 1959, the Fund was wealthy enough to write off as a current
expense approximately $7 million for the new building it occupies. Its
lowest annual earned income was $14.6 million in fiscal 1961, its
highest, $47.7 million in fiscal 1965; expenses rose to only $13.1 million
in 1964 and $22.2 million in 1965. The General Reserve, which represents cumulative net income from operations, stood at $141.8 million
at that time. Altogether the Fund has had an annual income from
investments and operations of at least twice its expenses for each year
since fiscal 1957, and it has funded reserves with a total value of $290
million, more than 12 times its highest annual expenditure of $22.2
million in fiscal 1965. A systematic presentation of the annual figures
is found in appendix A.
"Id. at 114.
'Id. at 115.
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The sources of this income are such that the Fund seems certain to
maintain its present state of financial strength. Although its operational income will probably continue to fluctuate to some extent, the
high level of world trade and investment is likely to keep the Fund
busy selling currencies to compensate for imbalances in national payments statistics. The increased use of standby arrangements will assure a more continuous flow of income than the Fund experienced in
its first few years of operation. 0 In any case, operating expenses
should remain relatively stable, and the wide margin between income
and expenses leaves a substantial area in which fluctuation of income
would be a matter of little concern. It seems inconceivable that with
the present level of reserves any change in income or expenditure
could threaten the Fund without a grace period of many years in which
to make whatever adjustments might be necessary.
Furthermore, the investment income of the Fund, which every year
since 1959 has exceeded the operating expenses of that year, has grown
in the stable manner expected of government bonds, and could be increased still further in the future. The decision in the spring of 1965
to increase the quotas of all Fund members by 25 percent, with the
alternative of greater increases for certain members, 47 will raise by
$200 million the dollar amount of gold holdings that could be invested
without increasing the percentage of gold invested. And now that the
feasibility and efficacy of these investments has been shown for almost
10 years, it would certainly be possible to increase the percentage
amount to raise additional funds for a worthwhile purpose.
Before concluding this analysis of the income of the Fund, possible
uses of the money for purposes other than peacekeeping that the
Member nations might prefer should be considered. It is instructive
that so far this money has not been put to use. There is little opportunity for its use by the Fund in its present operations, because the income is insignificantly small in relation to the $20,000 million in gold
and Member currencies held by the Fund. The Fund has used some
of this money for technical assistance and training programs, but
these costs are already included in its expenses. Between 1950 and
1964, 339 people, or an average of 24 per year, participated in Fund
"A standby arrangement allows a nation, for a fee of one-fourth of 1 percent, to
agree with the Fund to set aside an appropriate sum for withdrawal at will during
the next 6 months. It is often used to bolster the "image" of a currency to offset
rumors of impending devaluation. The fee is subject to rebate in case of early cancellation and is credited against the drawing fee if the funds are actually withdrawn.
" Board of Governors Res. Nos. 20-6, 20-7 in 1965 IMF ANN. REP. 124.
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training programs. 3 A program of this magnitude is unlikely ever to
cost many millions of dollars. Even the expanded program of the new
IMF Institute would not use a perceptible fraction of the Fund's
accumulated income.
New fields of activity are also unlikely. The Fund is a very specialized institution, carefully designed to deal with a particular set of
problems, and it is improbable that a high level of income would or
should be made the basis for very different kinds of activity on its
part. Fund income cannot be significantly reduced by cutting the interest rates49 or service charges of the Fund, because their purpose is
largely deterrent.50 This fact is apparent from the schedule of charges,
which is graduated in 6-month intervals from a 2 percent charge in
the first period to 5 percent in the ninth. When the rate paid by a
Member exceeds 4 percent, it must consult with the Fund on methods
of dealings with its balance-of-payments difficulties. Repurchase by
the Member of its own currency within 3 to 5 years is required." The
service charge of one-half of 1 percent is already at the minimum
allowed under the Fund articles.5 s It appears, therefore, that the
Fund has and will continue to have a substantial and growing net income from both investments and operations, which have no readily
apparent alternative use and could amply finance a United Nations
Peace Fund.
The Bank, unlike the Fund, has had a very stable and satisfactory
financial record from the beginning.5 3 Only in its first year did it have
a net deficit, with earnings of $1.2 million and expenses of $2.1 million. The next year gross income jumped to $18.7 million while total
expenses amounted to $10.4 million, leaving a profit which more than
compensated for the previous deficit. Since then gross income has
risen every year, to $267.6 million in fiscal 1965,11 while total expendiKroc, The Financial Structure of the Fund, 2 FINANCE &

DEVELOPMENT

46

(1965).
" The level of charges was slightly altered in May 1963, to the benefit of those
whose drawings exceeded their quotas by more than 75 percent but less than 100
percent. H. AUFmcHT, THE INTERNATIONAL. MONETARY FUND: LEGAL BASES, STRUCTURE, FuNcTION 60-61 (1964).
' Kroc, supra note 48, at 58.
'See 1 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 8 (1964).
'IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. V, § 8, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (1945) (herein-

after cited as IMF ARTICLES).
I Bank income and expenditures are taken from: IBRD, THE WORLD BANK, IFC
AND IDA, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS (1962) ; IBRD annual reports for various years;
and IBRD Press Release No. 65/36 (Aug. 11, 1965).
'The fiscal year begins on July 1 of the previous year, and ends June 30 of the
year named.
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tures have risen evenly to $129.9 million, largely for interest on Bank
borrowings.
The net income of the Bank, until 1964, was allocated to either a
Special Reserve or a Supplemental Reserve, depending on its source.
The Bank's Articles of Agreement require that all income resulting
from "commissions received by the Bank under Sections 4 and 5 of
this Article shall be set aside as a special reserve, which shall be available for meeting liabilities of the Bank. .. ," The next section of the
agreement, section 7(b) of article IV, provides that this Reserve shall
be the first drawee in case of a default on a loan. Commissions have
grown over the years from $3.1 million in fiscal 1948 to $33.2 million
in fiscal 1964. There have apparently been no defaults on loans in the
history of the Bank, 6 and over the years the Special Reserve has
grown to $289.0 million. The average Bank loan is $20 million, only
about one-fifteenth of the size of the Special Reserve. Recognizing
that the purposes of the Special Reserve were well met by this amount,
the Executive Directors, by means of a functional, if historically inaccurate, interpretation of the Bank Agreement, determined that the
sums which had up to now been treated as commissions under the
article quoted above would no longer be so treated, and would be
considered ordinary income, with some minor exceptions.57 As a result, "commissions" fell from $33.2 million in fiscal 1964 to $.8 million
in fiscal 1965, and other income increased in a corresponding amount.
Net income from sources other than those referred to above has been
regularly allocated to the Supplemental Reserve created by the Executive Directors in July, 1950."' The only charges that have been made
against this reserve are losses or gains resulting from devaluation or
revaluation of currencies acquired by the Bank from third parties;
i.e., not as part of a Member's capital subscription or repayment by it
of an IBRD loan in its own currency.59 Up to fiscal 1964, these losses
of $4.3 million had been largely offset by gains of $3.3 million. As a
' INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT, art. IV, § 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1502 (1945) (hereinafter cited as IBRD

ARTICLES).

'There is an explicit statement to this effect in IBRD, THE WORLD BANK, IFC

AND IDA, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 61 (1962), and subsequent annual reports reveal

no trace of any defaults.
IBRD Press Release No. 64/30 (Aug. 11, 1964).
IBRD, FirrH ANN. REP. 38 (1951).
IBRD ARTICLES, supra note 55, art. II, § 9 protects against other types of
devaluation. The only type of situation in which the Bank itself takes the loss is
where Member A pays the Bank in Member B's currency, and B devalues while the
Bank is still holding that money.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

EVOL. 42:1017

result, the Supplemental Reserve stood at $667.9 million in June, 1965,
not including total contributions of $125 million out of net income in
fiscal 1964 and 1965 to the International Development Association
(IDA). In short, the Bank has never had an operating loss since the
first year, and it now has funded Reserves of $956.9 million, which
have been drawn on only to the extent of $1.0 million as a result of
currency devaluations. 0 A complete summary of the Bank's income
and expenses is given in appendix B.
An analysis of the sources of Bank income indicates that it can be
expected to continue its record of growing profits. The income of the
Bank is raised in several different ways. One is investment of money
which it has not yet loaned or which it is holding in its Reserves. In
fiscal 1965 these items totaled $1,284.5 million, and produced interest
of $61.4 million, or almost 20 percent of the gross income for the year,
at presumably a very modest cost to the Bank. A second source of
income is what are called commitment charges-a fee on loaned funds
as yet undispersed, of which the Bank had $1,662.6 million in 1965.
In fiscal 1965 these fees dropped to $5.7 million from the $10.2 million
of the previous year because of a cut in the rate from three-fourths of
1 percent to three-eighths of 1 percent at the beginning of fiscal 1965.
The major source of income is, of course, interest on loans guaranteed by the Member governments, to public and private concerns. The
Bank had loaned a total $8,954.6 million by the end of fiscal 1965, of
which $2,984.0 million had been repaid, cancelled, or assigned to other
creditors, and $489.9 million was not yet realized. The other $5,480.6
million was held by the Bank, but $1,662.6 million was still undisbursed. Of the remaining $3,818.1 million, $2,724.0 million has been
borrowed by the Bank itself at an interest cost of $105.5 million in
1965, and loaned out at slightly higher rates. The income from these
"commissions," combined with the income of the Bank on lendings of
its own money, produced $192.9 million in fiscal 1965, almost threefourths of the Bank's total income.
It is important to note that of the $3,818 million outstanding, only
$1,094.1 million represents the Bank's own capital, despite the fact
that its subscribed capital exceeds $21,669 million. This situation
results from the fact that the original capital shares (totalling $10,000
million) were payable in United States dollars or gold only up to 2
' These reserve balances are larger than those given officially by the Bank because
they include current income allocated to reserves. See appendix B, note 3.
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percent of their value. A further 18 percent was paid in in the Member's own currency, and its use must be approved by the Member.
The remaining 80 percent is merely "on call." 61 When the subscriptions of all Members were doubled in December, 1958,2 it was decided that none of the newly-subscribed shares would be called.63
Since then, whenever a new Member is allotted its shares, 64 or a particular Member's quota is increased,6 5 half of the shares are 2 percent
and IS percent called, and the other half are uncalled.
The reason for this huge capital subscription, of which only 10
percent may be loaned either with or without permission, is that these
callable shares are intended as a surety for the Bank when it borrows
money from private lending institutions, rather than as a basis for
lending of the Bank's own funds. The subscriptions are more than
sufficient for this purpose, because the United States share alone is
more than twice the total of private borrowings. The income of the
Bank could be greatly increased if a greater percentage of the money
it loaned were its own, rather than money borrowed from private
sources on which interest of about 4 percent is being paid. It should
be possible to utilize existing subscriptions for this purpose, either by
calling the 2 percent portion of the uncalled shares or by inducing
Members to release the 18 percent portions for Bank use.66 But even
with its present mode of operation the Bank is making very handsome
profits on its investments and on loans to stable public authorities.6 7
There is every reason to expect that the continued emphasis on economic development and the recent independence of many African and
Asian nations will create a far greater demand for Bank loans in the
future, with the same profitable results.
ARTICLES, supra note 55, art. II, §§ 5, 7.
"-'Board of Governors Res. No. 128, in 1959 IBRD SuMaRY
O1
IBRD

(hereinafter cited as IBRD

PROCEEDINGS

PROCEEDINGS).

Id. Res. No. 129.

1964 IBRD PROCEEDINGs, Res. No. 209.
E.g., id. Res. No. 210.

" It may be that private financial interests would be opposed to an expansion of
Bank operating capital as a threat to their profits from continued lending to the
Bank. But it seems reasonable to suppose that the proportion of lending based on
borrowed funds could be substantially diminished over several years without decreasing the absolute amount borrowed as the volume of Bank loans increases.
' Although the Bank very often makes loans to private corporations, it is required
by art. III, § 4(i) of the Bank Agreement to get a guarantee from the Member
government. These Guarantee Agreements bind the government "as primary obligor
and not as surety merely" for all of the obligations of the borrower. See, e.g., Guarantee Agreements with Chile, Loan Number 5 CH, Mar. 23, 1949, and with Ethiopia,
Loan Number 441, ET, Dec. 28, 1965.
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The possible alternative uses for the income of the Bank present a
more serious objection to its use for peacekeeping than they did in the
case of the Fund." There are several possible uses for the Bank's
income: it could be loaned to Members, or used to lower interest
charges on presently outstanding loans, or to provide grace periods
before repayment must begin."9 Some of these avenues are being
pursued by the Bank at the present time through the medium of the
IDA, to which the Bank has allocated $125 million, over half of its
net income for each of the last 2 years. The IDA is an affiliate of the
Bank which makes loans on much better terms than the Bank-no
interest, three-fourths of 1 percent service charge, no principal payments for 10 years, 50 years to repay-for projects like water supply
systems and technical training, for which the Bank rarely lends money,
as well as for power, transportation, and agriculture. 7 The Bank
already has a training and technical assistance program which has
"expanded rapidly," but its cumulative cost in the 4 years since 1961
71
is less than $10 million.

There can be no statistically demonstrable answer to the question
of whether the world would be better served by a greater United Nations peacekeeping capacity as opposed to an equivalent amount of
investment in economic development. However, a strong argument can
be made that an extra dollar's worth of peacekeeping would be far
more valuable in today's world. The amount of money necessary for
an adequate Peace Fund represents less than 3 percent of the present
level of annual capital investment in underdeveloped areas. 72 Therefore, its use for that purpose would hardly have a perceptible effect.
Furthermore, an effective Peace Fund would protect and encourage
economic development, both by creating a better climate for private
investment, and by freeing public funds presently used for military
purposes. For example, the Indo-Pakistani war in the summer of
'The
Bank has recently made provision to assist private investment in underdeveloped countries by amending its articles to allow loans of its capital and borrowed
funds to its affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The loans to
the IFC need not be made from the Bank's income, however, so they would not be
affected by the use of some Bank income to support peacekeeping. For the text of the
amendment, see 1964 IBRD PROCEEDINGS at 55.
Wilson, World Bank Operations, 1 FINANcE & DEVELOPIENT 24 (1964).
soIBRD, THE WORLD BANK, IFC AND IDA, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 103-08

(1962).
Gordon, Charting the Channels for Development Capital, 2 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 86 (1965).
2About $9 billion is invested each year in the less developed areas of the world.
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1966, at 11, col. 1.
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1965 substantially injured the economic development of both nations,
and their continuing expenditure on armaments had diverted billions of
dollars from productive economic use."3 If by 1954 the United Nations had developed a sufficient peacekeeping capacity to enforce the
Geneva agreements on Indochina, the two billion dollars which the
United States alone is spending each month 4 might have been saved.
And there is no reason to believe that analogous events in future years
would not be affected to any equally crucial degree by a stronger
United Nations. In other words, the choice in the long run is not
really between peacekeeping and economic development, but between
the miniscule expenditure on international peacekeeping and the much
larger costs of competitively preparing for war. The Fund and the
Bank can provide the resources necessary for international peacekeeping without affecting their primary functions. Both organizations
have large net incomes, substantial reserves, and every expectation of
steadily expanding net income in the future. Investment of a portion
of this excess in peacekeeping would be remunerative to the world as
a whole, and would free other funds for economic development.
If it is agreed that the Fund and the Bank have sufficient net income
to finance a United Nations Peace Fund, the next question is who will
bear the burden of this financing. There are many ways of answering
it. From a legal standpoint, the burden is borne by those nations who
would otherwise have the right to the funds being transferred to the
United Nations. The income of the two Organizations is a return on
capital shares subscribed by the Members; hence the contribution can
be thought of as being apportioned according to Members' quotas.
The United States would be contributing 26 percent of the Fund income and 29 percent of the Bank income, as contrasted to its United
Nations Regular Budget share of 32 percent. The United Kingdom
would be responsible for about 12 percent of each rather than the 7
percent which it contributes to the Regular Budget; France would give
slightly less than its present United Nations share and China slightly
more. None of the Communist countries (except Yugoslavia) would
make any contribution at all, although they are assessed for over
73 Although little damage was done to capital equipment or infrastructure
in
either country, the costs of mobilization and replacement of destroyed military
equipment were substantial for both nations. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1966, at 37, col. 6,
and 48, col. 1.
' Statement of Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in answer to a question of Senator
Clark. 113 CONG. REc. 2572 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1967).
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21 percent of the United Nations budget. On the other hand, the
Federal Republic of Germany, which is not a Member of the United
Nations, would contribute about 5 percent of this proposed Peace
Fund. 75 The share of the smaller nations, because of the lower United
States share and the absence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
would be almost uniformly slightly higher than their United Nations
assessments. A complete comparison of United Nations contributions
and Fund and Bank subscriptions in percentage terms is presented in
appendix C.
The Fund and Bank Agreements, however, do not provide for distribution of dividends precisely in proportion to capital contributions.
Article XII, section 6(b) of the Fund Agreement provides:
If any distribution is made, there shall first be distributed a two percent non-cumulative payment to each member on the amount by which
seventy-five percent of its quota exceeded the Fund's average holdings of
its currency during that year. The balance shall be paid to all members in
proportion to their quotas. Payments to each member shall be made in
its own currency.
In other words, before distributing income according to capital shares,
the Fund will in effect pay 2 percent interest on the average amount
of a Member's currency that the Fund has actually sold to other
Members that year. It is impossible to predict how this would affect
the distribution from year to year. Generally, countries with stable,
freely-convertible currencies and with a favorable balance of payments would receive greater dividends, and would in effect be paying
more for the Peace Fund. It would perhaps be appropriate that those
who are gaining most from a stable world environment do slightly more
to protect it.
The Bank's dividend provision, though originally copied from that
of the Fund,76 is slightly different:

(b) If any part is distributed, up to two percent non-cumulative shall
be paid, as a first charge against the distribution for any year, to each
"'West Germany is already contributing to United Nations peacekeeping. It has
pledged $3.5 million, the third largest share, to the emergency force in Cyprus this
year. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, § 1, at 4, col. 4. It also contributes to other United
Nations activities in which it participates. See U.N. Doc. A/6202 (1965).
" The Fund Agreement was so closely copied that the first draft of the Bank
Agreement referred to the percentage of Fund holdings rather than to the percentage
of Bank lending. PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMETS OF UNITED NATIoNS MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, BRETTON WOODS, N.H., JULY 1-22, 1944.
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member on the basis of the average amount of loans outstanding during
the year made under Article IV, Section 1(a) (i), out of currency corresponding to its subscription. If two percent is paid as a first charge,
any balance remaining to be distributed shall be paid to all members in
proportion to their shares....
Here again, the first 2 percent is payable like interest on the basis of
the amount of that Member's currency (the 9 percent of capital subscriptions paid in) which is actually loaned out. Because it is impossible to know in advance whose currency will be loaned, it is impossible to predict precisely how the dividends would be paid, and therefore what contribution each Member would in effect be making to the
Peace Fund.
From a functional standpoint, however, it is somewhat unrealistic
to say that nations are contributing in proportion to dividends receivable, because neither the Fund nor the Bank has declared a single
dividend in their 20-year histories. In one sense therefore it could be
said that no nation pays, because the plan could be effected without
altering the obligations or available resources of any Member of the
Bank, the Fund, or the United Nations. On the other hand, if certain
alternative uses for these funds are considered, one can view the burden as falling on the underdeveloped nations, at least so far as the
Bank income is concerned. But the argument presented above indicates that using this money for effective peacekeeping might actually
make more funds available for economic development by improving
the international environment. It should also be recognized that the
use of these funds for United Nations peacekeeping can be expected
to improve the international situation far more concretely than would
many other possible uses. The marginal utility of a United Nations
Peace Fund would seem to be much more valuable to the world, for
example, than the addition of $200 million to the loanable funds of the
Bank or IDA. In general, the distribution of the burden of financing
the Peace Fund by this method would be equitable except for the
exclusion of the communist nations, and perhaps some sort of ad hoc
arrangement could be worked out with any communist Members who
are interested. The more serious problems of avoiding direct control
by a small group of nations and of assuring the appropriate balance of
flexibility and certainty will be explored below in relation to the available legal techniques for transferring this income to a Peace Fund.
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ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ARRANGING THE TRANSFER
OF A PORTION OF FUND AND BANK REVENUES

To evaluate properly the alternative systems of transfer that might
be used, it is necessary to survey the present legal structure within
which the plan must operate and the procedural requirements for altering this framework. The United Nations Charter contains several
relevant provisions. Article 17(2) provides that "The expenses of the
Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the
General Assembly." The practice of the United Nations indicates general agreement that the provision does not require all expenses to be
paid by member contributions; income from the Gift Shop and other
independent sources of revenue have established this principle. 7 Furthermore, Professors Goodrich and Hambro state in their commentary
on the charter that article 49 rather than this section covers the
financing of enforcement actions,7 8 but this theory has never been
tested. One alternate holding of the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations of the International Court of Justice 70
was that the United Nations has not yet financed an enforcement
action, because both UNEF and ONUC were invited to the nations on
whose territory they operated and were not formed precisely for the
purpose of coercing any government into obeying the charter or a
United Nations resolution. But, the decision also concluded that,
however the United Nations incurs an obligation, article 17 governs its
apportionment.
Articles 57 and 63 provide that the United Nations shall establish
relationships with the Specialized Agencies by means of agreements
negotiated by the Economic and Social Council and approved by the
General Assembly. A majority vote is sufficient, and neither Great
Power unanimity nor ratification by Members is necessary. Of course
the Specialized Agency must also approve the agreement by appropriate procedures. The purpose of these agreements is to facilitate
coordination among these Agencies and between the Agencies and the
United Nations under articles 58, 63 and 64. Article 17(3) allows the
General Assembly to examine the budgets of Specialized Agencies, but
it gives no power to alter them or mingle funds; and none of these
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION" OF PEACE, supra note 32 at 256-57.

L. GOODRICH & E. HAMIBRO,
295-96 (2d ed. 1949).
[1962] I.C.J. REP. 155.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED

NATIONS 184 n.90,
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articles gives the United Nations power to force the Specialized Agencies to take any action or give it any assistance."
Article 103 provides that the charter shall prevail over any other
international agreement when a Member faces a conflict of obligations.
The wording of the article makes it apply to both prior and subsequent
agreements, but it is argued by the Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties
of the International Law Commission, Sir Humphrey Waldock, that
the draftsmen had only prior treaties in mind. He claims that the
drafting committee relied on article 2(2), requiring fulfillment of
charter obligations in good faith, to prevent Members from making
subsequent inconsistent treaties. 8 In either case, the charter has
priority over all conflicting treaty obligations of Members. Amendment of the charter under article 108 requires adoption by two-thirds
of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the Members including all permanent Members of the Security Council. The
effect of this stringent rule is to make amendment impossible unless
virtually all of the Members can be persuaded to assent and ratify.
Many provisions of the Fund and Bank Agreements are important
to the present inquiry. The allocation of any dividends distributed has
been described above. In both organizations the decision to distribute
income is solely in the hands of the Board of Governors and cannot be
delegated to the Executive Directors.82 The same is true of making
arrangements, other than "informal arrangements of a temporary or
administrative character," with other international organizations."
Each agreement also has a provision regulating relations with other
international organizations, promising general cooperation, with the
following limitation: "Any arrangements for such cooperation which
would involve a modification of this Agreement may be effected only
after amendment to this Agreement under [the article on amendment].",4 It may be assumed that only an ordinary majority is re-

quired to approve such an agreement if it does not conflict with the
Fund and Bank Agreements, because if a sufficient majority for amendment were required, the provision quoted would be academic. The
s GooDRca & HAMBRo, supra note 78, at 380.
' U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/156 at 58 (1963).
fIMF
ARTIcLES, supra note 52, art. XII, § 2(b); IBRD ARTICLES, supra note

55, art. V, § 2(b).
E Id.
8

1IMF ARTicLES,

supra note 52, art. X; IBRD ARTIcLES, supra note 55, art. V, § 8.
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Bank Agreement prohibits loans of capital owned or borrowed by the
Bank to other international organizations, except for its affiliate,
IFC" Similarly the Fund can make "sales" only to Members.
Members of the Fund and the Bank are given 250 votes each, plus
one for each $100,000 of quota or share of stock, respectively, with
some relatively minor special weighting arrangements in the Fund for
certain actions.86 The result is a weighted voting system in which votes
are almost equal to the amount committed, and the seven largest contributors to the Fund and the six largest stockholders in the Bank
constitute majorities. Except where specially provided, a majority of
votes cast will pass a resolution in either organization. In both, amendment of the articles requires three-fifths of the Members holding fourfifths of the votes to accept after approval by the Board of Governors.87 Under the Fund and Bank Agreements, the Executive Directors have the power to interpret the Articles of Agreement, and the
only right of appeal is to the Board of Governors.""
The Fund is completely immune from the judicial process of the
courts of member nations, and its "property and assets" are "immune
from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form
of seizure by executive or legislative action" anywhere. Immunity
from taxation is also specifically provided.8 The Bank has much less
protection. Its property and assets have the same immunity from
seizure, etc. and from taxation. However, the Bank may be served
with process and its 'assets levied upon after judgment, except "by
members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members."""
The provision is clearly designed for the benefit of holders of Bank
securities, thus making the securities more marketable.
In 1947, the Economic and Social Council negotiated and the General
Assembly approved virtually identical agreements with the Fund and
the Bank, although they provided for so little substantive cooperation
'See note 67 supra.

" IMF ARTIcLES, supra note 52, art. XII, § 5; IBRD ARTICLES, supra note 55,
art. V, § 3.
' IMF ARTICLES, supra note 52, art. XVII; IBRD ARiTLEs, supra note 55, art.
VIII.
s8 IMF ARTICLES, supra note 52, art. XVIII(a), (b); IBRD ARTICLES, supra note
55, art. IX.
'IMF ARTICLES, supra note 52, art. IX, §§ 3, 4, 9.
I IBRD ARTICLES, supra note 55, art. VII, §§ 3, 4, 9. It is a nice question

whether a United States court could be persuaded to allow service of process unde-

the quoted language in an action by the United Nations to collect a duly authorized
debt. The language would seem to allow it, but it certainly was not the intent of the

drafters.
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that their adoption by the United Nations was widely disapproved.9
The agreements were adopted by the Fund and the Bank on September
17, 1947, and September 16, 1947, respectively.92 There is no indication
of the size of the vote given or required, and the only recorded discussion was the suggestion by the Yugoslavian delegate that the agreements should provide for closer cooperation. It is perhaps significant
that nothing in the agreements resulted in a concession which would
require amendment of the Fund or Bank Articles. The agreements provide for reciprocal representation, consultation, coordination of statistical services, and exchange of certain kinds of information. Article X
of each agreement provides for "Administrative Relationships," which
in the area of finance requires nothing more than submission of the
quarterly and annual reports. Section 3 of article X concludes with
the following sentence:
The United Nations agrees that in the interpretation of paragraph 3 of
Article 17 of the United Nations Charter it will take into consideration
that the Fund [Bank] does not rely for its annual budget upon contributions from its members, and that the appropriate authorities of the
Fund [Bank] enjoy full autonomy in deciding the form and content of
such budget.
Neither budget is included with those of the United Nations and the
Specialized Agencies in the annual review by the Fifth Committee of
the General Assembly. Under article XIII, section 3, both agreements
are subject to revision at any time by a subsequent agreement.
With this background in mind, alternative solutions to the legal
problem of transferring a portion of Fund and Bank net income to the
United Nations may be considered. There are four general lines of
legal theory upon which an adequate arrangement might be based:
tax, voluntary contribution, agreement, and loan. All of these methods
are equally satisfactory insofar as some of the basic criteria are concerned; viz., the wide distribution of the burden, the minimal cost of
transferring the funds, and the neutrality of the Secretariat will be
unaffected by the choice of legal scheme. Satisfaction of other requirements does depend on the choice, however; and a balance may have to
be struck which may not fully meet all of the tests. The acceptability
11GOODRICH & HAMBRO,
NATIONS, supra note 34,

supra note 75 at 349; see, e.g., TH BUDGET OF THE UNITED
at 37, which suggested that informal relations for several

years might lead to a better long-run result.
11IMIF BOARD OF GOvERxORs 1947 SUMARY PROCEEDINGS 36; 1947 IBRD PROCEEDINGS 16.
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of any method is of course crucial (though it is not completely independent of the degree to which the particular technique fulfills the
other requirements). Evaluation in this regard will necessitate consideration of the amount of support, and therefore the legal procedures, required for adoption. Protection of the interests of the Fund
and the Bank, as well as the United Nations, may demand some
flexibility in determining the amount of funds transferred from year to
year; this interest must be balanced against the need indicated earlier
for the certainty which can generate confidence in the United Nations.
Similarly, the need for certainty requires that the power to cut off all
support does not fall into the hands of a few nations, who might use
that power in an undesirable way. All of these factors must be weighed
in evaluating these alternative legal mechanisms.
The most radical alternative would be United Nations taxation of
the net income of the Fund and the Bank. This step would completely
reverse the originally intended relationship between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The League of Nations Covenant
provided in article 24, section 1, that all international bureaus created
after the League, and any other international organization that was
willing, would be "under the direction of the League." Section 3 of that
article provided for a unified budget, and such an arrangement actually
existed with the International Labor Organization. With a completely
unified budget, it can be assumed that if a subordinate bureau earned
more than its expenses, the excess would have been automatically added
to the general revenues of the League. Thus under the system envisaged
by the League of Nations Covenants, the question of a tax on specialized organizations would have been academic.
But the draftsmen of the United Nations Charter, aware of the
difficulties that the League's problems created for closely-related organizations, felt that the Specialized Agencies could function more
3
effectively if they were insulated from politics by greater autonomy.
Consequently, the relationships between the United Nations and the
Specialized Agencies are regulated by negotiated agreements provided
for in articles 57, 58 and 63. Nothing in the charter as it now exists
provides any basis for the imposition of a tax. There is no unified
budget, and the Agency budgets are presented to the General Assembly
for examination but not alteration. The underlying concept of suborIGOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 75, at 186. For a description of how the League
Council's control over economic and social programs inhibited their operations in
the 1930's see WALTERS, A HisToRy OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIoNs 756-62 (1952).
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dination found in the League Covenant has been replaced by a concept
of cooperation among equals.
As a result, several legal obstacles must be removed before such a
tax could be imposed. Amendment of the charter would be necessary.
The requirement of ratification by two-thirds of the Members, including the five Great Powers, makes any charter amendment slow, and
the outcome doubtful. An amendment of this nature would take years.
Furthermore, charter amendment alone would be insufficient for two
reasons. First, the "supremacy clause" of the charter speaks only of
conflicting obligations of Members, which is an inadequate basis for
the assertion of authority over an international organization as such.
It might be argued that after voting for such an amendment of the
charter, Members would be bound by article 103 and article 2(2) to
act in good faith to make the Fund and Bank comply. However, this
commitment would not insure the desired result because the different
94
membership and voting requirements enable charter amendment
without the support of all of the nations needed to amend the Fund
and Bank Agreements.
Second, the terms of the Fund and Bank Articles of Agreement,
which explicitly require specific, formal amendment to alter their substance, imply an abandonment of capacity by Fund and Bank Members to reach a subsequent agreement affecting these institutions
through other procedures, such as United Nations Charter amendment, according to the analysis of the Rapporteur of the International
Law Commission on the Law of Treaties.9 5 Thus even if the "supremacy clause" could be effectively invoked by the United Nations,
United Nations Members who are also Fund and Bank Members are
legally obligated under those agreements not to vote in favor of overriding the Agreements by charter amendment. If by amending the
United Nations Charter the Fund and Bank Agreements could be
changed, the voting rights of certain Members of the Fund and Bank
could be nullified because of the differences in membership and voting
power between the United Nations and the Fund and Bank indicated
above. Establishment of a legally effective tax power would therefore
require the support of enough nations to satisfy the amendment pro" A charter amendment supported by the Soviet bloc, the Great Powers, and
enough other Members to comprise just two-thirds would succeed, while support from
these same Nations in the Fund or the Bank would not amount to three-fifths of their
Members.
'5 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 at 53 (1963).
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cedures of both the United Nations Charter and the Fund and Bank
Agreements. A single document amending all three could be used, but
in any case the difficulty of getting enough ratifications to meet all the
amendment requirements would be formidable.
The content of such an amendment to the charter should reflect
decisions on whether a maximum percentage of net income which could
be taken should be stipulated, and what methods of enforcement could
be used. If the tax is approved, enforcement is unlikely to be a
problem because an amendment would require the support of the
permanent -Members of the Security Council, and they control by
themselves almost 42 percent of the votes in the Fund and almost
45 percent of the votes in the Bank. However, governments change
their views, and an adequate procedure for enforcement should be
provided. The power to levy on the assets of the Fund or the Bank by
order of municipal courts seems to be the most reasonable solution, but
it would be novel to give national courts the power to act on behalf of
the United Nations against international organizations. The reluctance
of national courts to enmesh themselves in international affairs is well
known, and even in the absence of statutory prohibitions, national
courts have been unwilling to attempt any action against an international organization. 6
If a taxing power of this kind were to be given, it might be worthwhile to consider whether or not it should cover all Specialized Agencies, or only the Fund and the Bank. Including the other organizations
would produce a negligible income because none have substantial independent revenues at the present time. But it might be wise to extend
any charter amendment to make room for new developments and to
take a step in the direction of greater unity among all of the Specialized
Agencies and the United Nations. The constitutional provisions of the
other Specialized Agencies would have to be examined to determine
whether or not their inclusion would substantially increase the number of ratifications required to adopt the tax proposal.
General Assembly resolutions implementing an amendment of this
type could be used to fix the actual level of the tax, the details of
" Without either treaty or statutory protection the Pan American Union was
given immunity by the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia. See 20 Am. J.
INT'L L. 257 (1926).
In Schmidlin v. International Labor Office and the League of
Nations, 47 Sem. Jud.: J. Trib. 248-52 (Geneva, 1925), the League of Nations voluntarily appeared as defendant. The Swiss court, holding for the League on other

grounds, commented, "Though the League has voluntarily agreed to appear before
Geneva judges, one could contend that these judges should refuse ex officio to pronounce a judgment against the League."
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enforcement, and the accounting techniques to be used in determining
net income. Preferably by this means, but possibly in the amendment
itself, provision should be made for the maintenance of an adequate
level of reserves for both the Fund and the Bank. This protection could
be assured by any one of several formulas: e.g., exemption of a fixed
sum annually, exemption of a percentage of income if it is actually
placed in reserves, or exemption of sufficient funds to maintain reserves
at a certain percentage of the value of loans outstanding. The last of
these seems most appropriate. However, because the percentage of
income taken is likely to be relatively low, and reserves are already
quite substantial, the remaining income may be more than enough to
satisfy this need without special provision.
Giving the United Nations the authority to tax the independent income of the Fund and the Bank would have the advantage of providing
a guaranteed flow of income to the Peace Fund which could be adjusted at the unilateral discretion of the General Assembly to take account of Fund and Bank net income and the needs of all three organizations. It would also set a precedent for mutual support which seems
essential if the United Nations system is to grow to meet the world's
need for international order. The experience of the last 20 years indicates that the attempt to insulate the Specialized Agencies from
politics had failed,9' and increased coordination would strengthen the
United Nations system as a whole.
Against these advantages certain very serious disadvantages must
be weighed. Most important is the difficulty of amending the United
Nations Charter. Neither France nor the Soviet Union is likely to be
friendly toward this revolutionary proposal, which would strengthen
the United Nations and undermine their financial protest against certain General Assembly policies; and their support is essential. Furthermore, representatives of the Specialized Agencies might oppose a
plan which made such serious inroads into their independence, thus
dividing those who normally favor the strengthening of international
organizations. The problem of enforceability might also be serious if
the Fund or Bank refused to submit to the authority of the United
Nations. It may well be true that if these three Organizations had been
unified at their inception, the financial problems of the United Nations
would not exist today; nevertheless, a proposal of the kind outlined
" For examples of the use of participation in specialized agencies as a political
weapon, see Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal From an International Organi. ation, 77 HAmv. L. Rxv. 1381, 1401-16 (1964).
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above would appear to be too revolutionary for many nations. Other
less disruptive alternatives must be considered.
Structurally at the opposite extreme from the tax proposal would be
a decision by the Board of Governors of the Fund and the Bank to
make annual voluntary contributions to the United Nations Peace
Fund of a certain fixed percentage of their net incomes. The Governors have no explicit power to give contributions of Fund or Bank
income, however. The only power found in the articles of the two institutions is to distribute dividends; before 1964 it might well have been
argued that the Governors' only alternatives were to distribute income
as dividends or to allocate it to reserves. The Executive Directors of
the Bank, however, in a report dated July 30, 1964, recommended to
the Board of Governors that they transfer $50 million of the Bank's
$97.5 million 1964 net income to IDA. 8 Included in the report was the
following proposed Statement of Policy:
Any transfers to the Association will be made only out of net income
which (i) accrued during the fiscal year in respect of which the transfer
is made and (ii) is not needed for allocation to reserves or otherwise
required to be retained in the Bank's business and, accordingly, could
prudently be distributed as dividends.
Attached to this report was a document called Decision of the
Executive Directors of the Bank on Question of Interpretation of
Articles of Agreement. 9 The first six paragraphs describe the financial circumstances which gave rise to the proposal to give $50 million
to IDA. The remainder of the decision reads as follows:
7. Whereas the Executive Director for the United Kingdom has requested that, before taking action on this proposal, the Executive Directors decide, in accordance with Article IX of the Articles of Agreement
of the Bank, the question whether, if the Board of Governors shares
the views of the Executive Directors in the third, fourth and fifth clauses
hereof, the Board of Governors may, consistently with the Articles of
Agreement of the Bank, make the proposed transfer of $50,000,000 to
the Association;
Now therefore, the Executive Directors, having considered the question of interpretation, hereby decide it in the affirmative.
This report was approved and the income allocated to IDA at the next
annual meeting of the Board of Governors." 9° In 1965, $75 million was

given to IDA on the same basis.
1964 IBRD PROCEEDINGS 46-48.
' Id. Res. No. 208.
'

Id. at 48-49.
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Whatever the rationale of the decision, its holding is clear: the
Board of Governors does have the power to give away the income of
the Bank, at least within the limits of the Statement of Policy. The
"affiliate" relationship between the Bank and IDA would seem to be
irrelevant because the Bank has in any case irrevocably abandoned its
ownership of the funds. Similarly, the overlapping character of the
two institutions is not relevant to the question of the legal power of
the board, as distinct from the acceptability of its action. Because the
Fund Board of Governors has the same explicit powers in this respect
as the Bank Board, it is reasonable to assume that it too could make
voluntary contributions. Contributions to a United Nations Peace
Fund would seem to fall clearly within the powers recognized by the
Resolution, so no amendment of the Articles of Agreement of either
institution would be needed.
If outright contribution seemed too bold a step to take, the Fund
and Bank could treat the payments to the Peace Fund as expenses, in
the nature of insurance. The following rationale would apply: The
peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations help to maintain unrestricted international currency exchange and guard Bank investments.
Because increased United Nations capacity to maintain peace would
further protect Fund and Bank interests, they would be insuring their
financial and political well-being by transferring a part of what would
otherwise be net income to the United Nations Peace Fund. Both the
Fund and Bank Agreements implicitly permit payment of expenses incurred for goods or services, whether from an international organization or otherwise, so no amendments would be necessary.
This approach may be unorthodox, but it aptly recognizes the value
of peace. A major war between India and Pakistan, for example,
would endanger approximately $2,094 million in Bank loans and IDA
credits to those two countries, which represents over 20 percent of
their combined total lending. Furthermore, it is unlikely that either
India or Pakistan would be able for long to avoid imposing foreign
exchange restrictions which would violate the spirit and letter of their
obligations under the Fund Articles. 10 1 Private financial institutions
have long recognized the value of buying protection, directly or
through taxes, in the form of watchmen, police, and armies. And
banks often buy life insurance on their debtors' lives. It would not be
unreasonable for the Fund and the Bank to contribute to the Peace
Fund and treat it as an expense of operation.
I

See IMF ARTICLES, arts. I, VIII, XIV.
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A slightly different legal approach to voluntary contribution would
be to have the Fund and Bank declare dividends of the appropriate
total amount and contribute it to the Peace Fund on behalf of the
Members of the Fund and Bank. The money would come formally
from the Members themselves rather than from the two institutions.
But if this theory is pursued, there is no defense to the claim of a
particular Member of the Fund or Bank to take its dividend in cash.
The result would be that the independence sought through this means
of financing would disappear, and the unreliability of Member contributions for peacekeeping would remain as an obstacle to the strength
of the United Nations. But it could be overcome if Members were
willing to make some very substantial lump-sum contributions, of
perhaps $100 million or more, in each of the first few years. Then the
Peace Fund would have sufficient resources to finance an Emergency
Force even if a certain percentage of the subsequent contributions
were cut off by an opposing Member. Regular or irregular additions
to the Peace Fund could replenish it when necessary, and when the
international climate would make it least controversial.
The one great advantage of using Fund and Bank voluntary contributions to finance a Peace Fund is procedural simplicity; no amendment of either the United Nations Charter or the Fund and Bank
Articles would be required. The approach retains maximum flexibility in the hands of the Fund and Bank Governors, thus insuring
that those institutions would not suffer from a depletion of their resources. This flexibility is a weakness, however, from the point of
view of the United Nations. In the first years, before a pattern of
contributions is established, the absence of a guarantee of continuing
contributions would weaken the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping as compared to a more binding commitment of funds. A more
serious danger of this arrangement, even after a regular pattern of
contribution developed, would be the inherent possibility that in a
serious crisis Members of the Fund and Bank might vote to cut off
the funds. So long as a large number of nations thought this likely,
the United Nations would be deterred from taking any serious step
that would offend large Fund and Bank Members. The political effects
of this limitation on United Nations action would lessen the Organization's ability to deal with any crises involving certain major powers and
might result in an inequitable use of United Nations power. On the
other hand, once a pattern of contributions was well established, it
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might be very difficult from a diplomatic standpoint for a few nations
to cut it off arbitrarily. If so, this device might grow into a stable,
reliable method of financing a Peace Fund that preserved substantial
flexibility.
A third alternative is to base the transfer of funds on an amendment
to the agreements between the United Nations and the Fund and the
Bank. Such a provision would provide for annual payment of a percentage of net income and establishment of auditing procedures which
would insure fair compliance. It should explicitly provide that the
United Nations is to have unfettered discretion over the use of the
Peace Fund, just as the present agreement with the Bank provides
that it need not consider suggestions of the United Nations in its operations. 0 2 A provision to maintain the adequacy of Fund and Bank
reserves could be included if it were thought necessary, using one of
the formulas described above. The procedure for amending agreements between the United Nations and the two institutions is less
stringent than for amending the United Nations Charter or the Fund
and Bank Articles because only a majority of the General Assembly
and a majority of Fund and Bank votes are sufficient, and no ratification by Members is required.
Amendment of the United Nations Charter would be unnecessary
because the articles dealing with relations with Specialized Agencies do
not prevent this kind of cooperation, although it was probably not
contemplated by the draftsmen of these provisions. Whether the
Fund and Bank articles would need amendment is a more difficult
question. If this plan is thought of as a contractual obligation to make,
annual contributions of a portion of net income by the Fund and the
Bank per se it is difficult to find any authority in the present agreements for the action. While a power to give away a portion of each
year's income has been read into the agreements, accepting a permanent obligation to pay out a percentage of income would appear to
lie outside that power. Describing the obligation as a commitment
by the Members to give a portion of their dividends every year to the
Peace Fund is also unsatisfactory because it would imply an authority
to make agreements that bind Members, and it might be unwise for
other reasons to read such a potentially unlimited power into the
articles. The most expedient approach is to treat the payments as
expenses of the two institutions, as suggested above, which would avoid
"'2Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, art. IV, § 3.
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the need for amendments. The amendments to the agreements with
the United Nations would then be in effect a contract for professional
services, to be exercised in the sole discretion of the United Nations,
much as the manager of a "mutual fund" has complete control over
the disposition of the assets entrusted to him.
Even if amendment of the Fund and Bank Agreements were necessary, this plan would provide the major advantage of the outright taxcertainty-without the necessity of amending the United Nations
Charter. The agreement approach also reflects most accurately the
process that would undoubtedly take place in arranging such a transfer
because there would necessarily be a great deal of negotiation and
consultation between the United Nations, the Fund, the Bank, and the
Members of each before any steps were taken. If the parties to the plan
are going to negotiate more or less as equals at the planning stage, it
would seem somewhat artificial to end up with so unequal a relationship
as a tax, which would constitute a perpetual abandonment of power by
the Fund and Bank.
The inflexibility of this plan might well be greater than the tax,
however, because of the division of authority to alter the system. To
a substantial extent this difficulty can be avoided by regular consultation between the United Nations and the Fund and Bank on the
efficacy of the plan over the years. But where interests conflict, the
original agreement may be "frozen in" because one party or the other
is unwilling to diminish its rights. Careful drafting to anticipate the
possible dangers, financial or otherwise, that might develop will help,
and in a serious emergency changes are always possible. But it is
easier to preserve a good agreement than to amend a bad one. An
explicit, detailed allocation of authority, which at the same time preserves a maximum of flexibility, is essential.
A final alternative, which is really a variation of the agreement
approach, is to loan the income to the United Nations rather than
transfer it outright. °3 To serve the purpose of adequately financing
a Peace Fund, however, the terms would have to be low or no interest
and a long period provided for repayment. Even then there would be
an additional strain on the United Nations. Dissatisfied Members
might refuse to pay their share, just as the Soviet Union has opposed
amortization of United Nations Bonds through the Regular Budget as
3
"' A. Pollis, Financing the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association and
the International Finance Corporation 20 (mimeographed draft, 1962).
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a protest against the "underlying illegality" of the expenses incurred.
It seems likely that even if the transaction were described as a loan,
before long it would in effect become a permanent transfer through
periodic refinancing. However, if this intermediate step is necessary to
make the basic plan acceptable, it would be worth doing in any case.
The best overall approach to transferring Fund and Bank revenues
appears to be a two-part agreement to provide for a continuing flow
of funds, augmented by a few large payments to clear past debts and
to provide an immediate reserve. For the long run, the agreement
would provide a guaranteed flow of a relatively small amount, on the
order of $40 million a year, or about 20 percent of the present net income of the Fund and Bank, which would continue indefinitely unless
altered with the consent of two-thirds of the General Assembly. An
arrangement between the Fund and the Bank could allot the shares
between them annually, or each could be separately obligated. At the
same time, it would avoid the major legal obstacle to a tax proposal,
amendment of the United Nations Charter. If carefully tailored to this
particular purpose, the agreement would fully protect the interests of
both the United Nations and the Fund and Bank. In addition, to solve
the immediate crisis it would provide for supplementary payments,
totalling perhaps $200 million over 4 years, apportioned between the
Fund and the Bank as they think fit. Additional sums could be given
as contributions if necessary in the light of circumstances at that time.
These contributions would be based on the needs of the United Nations Peace Fund, the level of Fund and Bank reserves, and the other
uses to which the income might be put. This type of plan would give
the United Nations an assurance that over the long run its debts for
past and future peacekeeping would be liquidated, and at the same
time it would assure the Fund and Bank that most of their net income
would be at their disposal for whatever purposes they desired. The
advantages of a balance of certainty and flexibility, independence
from national control, and relative ease of adoption indicate that this
kind of agreement would be the most acceptable and most desirable
legal means of effecting the transfer of revenue to a United Nations
Peace Fund.
V. CONCLUSION
The historical record clearly demonstrates that annual contribution
by Members is an inadequate method of financing peacekeeping operations. The statistics of nonpayment take on added meaning when
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consideration of legal and political issues demonstrates that the disputes over financing will continue into the foreseeable future, exaggerated by major nations who are reluctant to relinquish their power
either outside or within the United Nations structure. The result is a
crisis for the United Nations because of its actual and perceived unreliability as an agent for peace. The problem of financing must be
solved so convincingly that it is apparent to all nations that the United
Nations has the financial capacity to preserve the peace. This result
can only be reached if a funded reserve is established in advance to
finance any emergency force that might be needed.
The most desirable means of financing a United Nations Peace
Fund would be to transfer to it a portion of the net income of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These public institutions had a combined net income of $193 million in fiscal 1965, and there is every
reason to believe that these incomes will grow steadily. Furthermore,
each has means by which it could substantially raise its income if it
were desirable, without any structural alterations. Such a plan would
not in any way threaten the integrity of the Secretariat or the operations
of the Fund and Bank. The cost of administration would be negligible,
and the burden of support would be widely spread. With a proper legal
framework, no nation would have the unilateral power to terminate the
flow of funds. The proposal should be acceptable to any nation which
is seriously interested in strengthening the United Nations.
The transfer of these funds could be provided by a United Nations
tax on the Fund and Bank, by voluntary contributions, by a modification of the agreements between the United Nations and these two
institutions, or by some combination of these approaches, either outright or as a loan. The best general solution would appear to be an
agreement to guarantee a relatively small amount of income, supplemented by a few large payments immediately, and subsequent voluntary contributions over the years, keyed to the needs of the Fund and
the Bank as well as the needs of the United Nations Peace Fund. It
would provide the certainty of a continuing flow of funds to the United
Nations, while retaining for the Fund and Bank the power to dispose
of most of their net income as they choose. This approach would require the approval of a majority of the General Assembly, and perhaps an amendment of the Fund and Bank Agreements. Neither of
these would be as difficult to obtain as a United Nations Charter
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amendment, however, and with a sincere effort by the major Western
powers, a program of this kind could easily win the necessary approval.
The result would be a stronger United Nations in the most crucial
field of all-the maintenance of international peace and security.
[Appendix begins on next page]
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APPENDIX C
Comparative Contributions and Voting:
United Nations, Fund, and Bank

Country

U.S.A.
U.S.S.R.
U.K.
France
Germany (F.R.)
China
Canada
Japan
Italy
Ukrainian S.S.R.
India
Australia
Poland
Sweden
Belgium
Czechoslovakia
Netherlands
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Spain
South Africa
Denmark
Hungary
Austria
Byelorussian S.S.R.
Venezuela
Indonesia
Norway
Finland
New Zealand
Pakistan
Yugoslavia
Philippines
Romania
Turkey
Chile
Greece
Columbia
U.A.R.
Cuba
Iran

United
Nations
Assessment
(1966-67)

Fund
Quota

(1963)

Bank Sub- Fund Votscription
ing Share

Bank Voting Share

(1965)

(1963)

(1965)

26.53

29.30

22.93

26.32

1"2".54

1"2'.00

10.91

10.84

5.07
5.07
3.54
3.54
3.22
1.74

4.84
4.84
3.46
3.46
3.07
3.07

4.49
4.49
3.18
3.18
2.90
1.63

4.44
4.44
3.20
3.20
2.85
2.85

3.86
2.57

3.69
2.46

3.45
2.35

3.41
2.30

.96
2.17

.92
2.08

.97
2.00

.93
1.96

2.65
1.80
1.80
1.16
.96
.96
.84

2.54
1.72
1.72
.80
.92
.92
.80

2.42
1.69
1.69
1.13
.97
.97
.86

2.37
1.64
1.64
.82
.93
.93
.82

.48

.46

.96
1.06
.64
.37
.80
.96
.77
.48

.65
1.01
.61
.35
.77
.92
.49
.46

.97
1.05
.69
.45
.83
.97
.80
.55

.68
1.01
.65
.42
.79
.93
.54
.52

.55

.53

.61

.58

.23

.64
.39
.64
.58

.43
.23
.43
.66

.69
.47
.69
.64

.49
.31
.49
.69

.20
.20

.45

.42

.52

.47

31.91
14.92
7.21
6.09

4.25
3.17
2.77
2.54
1.97
1.85
1.58
1.45
1.26
1.15
1.11
1.11
.95
.92
.81
.73
.73
.62
.56
.53
.52
.50
(.45)*
.44

.43
.38
.37

.36
.35

.555

.52

.35
.35
.27
.25
.23
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APPENDIX C-Continued

Country

B ulgaria
Nigeria
Ireland
Israel
Portugal
Thailand
Malasia
Morocco
Algeria
Uruguay
Peru
Ceylon
Ghana
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Burma
Kuwait
Sudan
Afganistan
Congo (L)
Equador
Jamaica
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Syria
Tunisia
Albania
Bolivia
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
C.A.R.
Chad
Congo (B)
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Dahomey
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras

United
Nations
Assessment
(1966-67)

.17
.17
.16
.16
.15
.14
.12
.11
.10
.10
.09
.08
.08
.08
.07
.06
.06
.06
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04

Fund
Quota
(1963)

Bank Sub- Fund Vot- Bank Votscription
ing Share ing Share
(1963)
(1965)
(1965)

........
.32
.29
.16
.39
.29
.23
.34
.39
.19
.24
.29
.23
.10
.35
.19
.32
.10
.14
.29
.10
.13
.04
.09
.10
.13

........
.31
.28
.31
.37
.28
.61
.32
.37
.05
.16
.28
.21
.07
.34
.18
.31
.28
.14
.28
.08
.12
.04
.09
.15
.14

........
.41
.39
.28
.47
.39
.33
.43
.47
.30
.35
.39
.33
.22
.44
.30
.41
.22
.26
.39
.22
.25
.18
.22
.22
.25

........
.38
.35
.38
.43
.35
.65
.39
.43
.15
.25
.35
.30
.17
.40
.27
.38
.35
.23
.35
.17
.21
.14
.19
.24
.23

.14
.07

.10
.07

.26
.20

.19
.17

.10
.05
.05
.05
.10
.07
.05
.07
.10
.05

.09
.05
.05
.05
.05
.07
.05
.05
.05
.05

.22
.18
.18
.18
.22
.20
.18
.20
.22
.18

.19
.14
.14
.14
.15
.17
.14
.15
.17
.14

.10
.10
.07
.10

.04
.09
.07
.04

.22
.22
.20
.22

.13
.19
.17
.13
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APPENDIX C-Continued
United

Country

Iceland
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Kenya
Korea (S.)
Laos
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
M alawi
Maldive Is.
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
M ongolia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leona
Singapore
Somalia
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
U. R. Tanzania
Upper Volta
Vietnam (S.)
Yemen
Zambia
*

Nations

Fund

Assessment

Quota

(1966-67)

.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
,04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
........
.04
.04

(1963)

Bank Sub- Fund Vot- Bank Votscription

(1965)

ing Share
(1963)

ing Share

(1965)

.17

.07
.10
.06
........
.12
.05
.07
.10
.10
........

.07
.09
.07
15
.
.12
.05
.07
.09
.09
........

.20
.22
.19
.18
.20
.22
.22

.14

.08

.08

.21

.17

.05
........
.05
.07
.05
.01
.07
.07
.16
.07
........
.07
.07
.13
.16
.16
.05
.13
........
........

.05
........
.05
.03
.05
.04
.03
.07
.15
.07
........
.07
.07
.12
.15
.15
.05
.14
........
........

.18

.14

.18
.20
.18
.14
.20
.20
.28
.20

.14
.13
.14
.14

.20
.20
.25
.28
.28
.18
.25

.17

.24

.19

.17
.24
.21

.17
19
.19

.13
.17
.24

.17
.17
,21
.24
.24
.14
.23

Because of Indonesia's ambiguous status, no United Nations assessment was assigned
to her at the 1965 session.

